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Article 4

FREE EXERCISE IN THE MIRROR
SHERRY COLB**
Recent U.S. Supreme Court cases present an opportunity to apply a new form
of analysis to discrimination claims. In 2018’s Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd.
v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission and 2021’s Fulton v. City of
Philadelphia, there is a party complaining about discrimination on each side
of the dispute. In both cases, one side (respondent) claims that the other
(petitioner) is discriminating based on sexual orientation, while the other
side (petitioner) claims that subjecting petitioner to the law prohibiting
sexual orientation discrimination itself discriminates based on religion. With
discrimination claims coming from both directions, this article performs
what it calls “mirror-image analysis” to better understand how the Court
thinks about the issues it faces in Free Exercise cases. Mirror-image analysis
takes a definition that the Court applies to one side of the dispute, whether it
is the definition of discrimination or of coercion, and then considers what the
other side’s claim would look like if it deployed a similarly capacious
definition of the term. The article uses hypothetical cases, some quite
provocative, to help clarify the nature of the Court’s approach to Free
Exercise. It concludes that because the religions at issue in both Masterpiece
Cakeshop and Fulton were mainstream Christian faiths, it takes a mirror to
appreciate how extreme the Court’s analysis of religious freedom has
become.
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**C.S. Wong Professor of Law, Cornell University. The author is very grateful to
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INTRODUCTION
In the last several years, the U.S. Supreme Court decided two important
religion cases which happen to be unusual in one significant respect. Each
case involved petitioners and respondents that appeared to be mirror images
of each other. Each side claimed it was the authentic victim of discrimination.
The mirror image structure allows us to evaluate the symmetry or lack thereof
in the Justices’ analysis of the issues going in both directions. In performing
this evaluation, we will see that the Court exhibited a profound empathy for
the religious petitioners in each case, Masterpiece Cakeshop (“MC,” referring
to both the baker and the corporate entity) and Catholic Social Services
(“CSS”), respectively. The selective empathy surfaced when the Court
deployed an extremely broad definition of “discrimination” for religious
petitioners while, in the very same disputes, applied a far stingier and
narrower definition of “discrimination” for the governmental entities
enforcing the laws prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination on behalf of
LGBTQ+ persons, whose own rights and interests the Court downplayed.
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In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,1 a
majority of the Justices failed to reach the merits of the principal First
Amendment issues presented2 but revealed quite a bit (about, among other
things, their heightened sensitivity to a moral critique of bigotry in the name
of religion) in what they ultimately did say. In the second, Fulton v. City of
Philadelphia,3 the Justices reached a conclusion on the merits that drew
criticism from progressives.4 In both cases, religious petitioners argued that
government actors had engaged in discrimination against petitioners’
respective religions.5 And both sets of traditional religious petitioners won
their cases.6
Most of the critical commentary on the two decisions and related
“shadow docket” Free Exercise cases during the COVID-19 pandemic points
out the flawed nature of how the Court applied the landmark 1990 precedent
of Employment Division v. Smith.7 Although the Justices said that Smith
1

138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723-24 (2018). I do not mean to suggest that Masterpiece Cakeshop
was the only important religion case on the Court’s docket in the October 2017 Term. The
Court, for example, rejected a religious discrimination claim in Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct.
2392, 2393 (2018).
2

These were the questions presented: “Whether applying Colorado’s public
accommodations law to compel Phillips to create expression that violates his sincerely held
religious beliefs about marriage violates the Free Speech or Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment.” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. (No.
16-111).
3

141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).

4

See, e.g., Andrew R. Lewis, The Supreme Court Handed Conservatives a Narrow
Religious Freedom Victory in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, WASH. POST (June 18, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/06/18/supreme-court-handedconservatives-narrow-religious-freedom-victory-fulton-v-city-philadelphia/ (warning that
the decision could create “a license to discriminate against LGBTQ people”).
5

Brief for Petitioners at 42, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. (No. 16-111) (claiming
that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission was targeting “a specific religious belief ‘for
discriminatory treatment’” (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 538 (1993)); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 18, Fulton, 141 S. Ct.
(No. 19-123) (“Philadelphia’s actions [against Catholic Social Services] were baseless,
discriminatory, and entirely unnecessary.”).
6
7

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1740; Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1882.

494 U.S. 872 (1990). For a background in the Court’s shifting Free Exercise
jurisprudence and an argument about the dangers in reinterpreting Smith, see James M.
Oleske, Jr., Free Exercise (Dis)Honesty, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 689, 739 (arguing that the
Court’s Free Exercise decisions over the last sixty years have tended to defy precedent by
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governs,8 meaning that the Free Exercise Clause requires general
applicability, neutrality, and non-discrimination, critics argue that the Court
in fact applied a label of “discrimination” to facially neutral government
activity that at most incidentally burdened religious practice.9 One critique
asserts that the Court covertly reverted to the regime of Sherbert v. Verner,10
which Smith overruled.11 Another account contends that the Court engaged
in an enterprise of protecting “Christian privilege,” by analogy to “white
privilege,” wherein the Court recognized the loss of unfairly appropriated
special entitlements as a cognizable harm against Christians.12 Still others
propose that the Court granted “most favored nation” status to religion,
thereby departing—perhaps rightly, perhaps wrongly—from the more formal

disingenuously interpreting it, and warning against continuing this pattern in reinterpreting
Smith). The “shadow docket” refers to cases the Court decides without plenary consideration.
See William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court's Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. &
Liberty 1, 3 (2015). For examples of Free Exercise cases on the Court’s shadow docket
during the pandemic, see infra note 39.
8

A majority of Justices in Fulton actually criticized Smith, but they nonetheless applied
it because they could not agree on a workable alternative. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1882–83
(Barrett, J., concurring) (noting that “[t]here would be a number of issues to work through if
Smith were overruled”).
9

See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, The Supreme Court Moves the Shadow Docket Out Into
the Light, SLATE (June 21, 2021) (statement of Professor Erwin Chemerinsky),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/06/fulton-v-philadelphia-supreme-court-religiousfreedom-discrimination.html (“The court’s saying the very possibility of exceptions is what
makes this religious discrimination. And that to me is a very troubling holding.”).
10

374 U.S. 398, 403, 406 (1963).

11

Emp. Div. v. Smith 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (“We conclude today that the sounder
approach, and the approach in accord with the vast majority of our precedents, is to hold the
[Sherbert] test inapplicable to such challenges.”). See, e.g., Michael Peabody, High Court
Hands Catholic Social Services Narrowly Drafted Victory, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY.TV (June
18, 2021), https://religiousliberty.tv/high-court-hands-catholic-social-services-narrowlydrafted-victory.html. Much of the criticism stems from the COVID-19 cases (including
primarily or exclusively cases on the shadow docket). See, e.g., Jim Oleske, Fulton Quiets
Tandon’s Thunder: A Free Exercise Puzzle, SCOTUSBLOG (June 18, 2021, 4:20 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/06/fulton-quiets-tandons-thunder-a-free-exercisepuzzle/.
12

Caroline Mala Corbin, Justice Scalia, the Establishment Clause, and Christian
Privilege, 15 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 185, 209 (2017); Caroline Mala Corbin, Should We
(July
17,
2020),
Placate
White
Christian
Fragility?,
BALKINIZATION
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2020/07/should-we-placate-white-christian.html.
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conception of neutrality associated with Smith.13 And some observers
maintain that the Court applied a disparate impact theory of discrimination of
the sort that the Justices sanctioned in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and that
Congress approved in the 1991 Civil Rights Act.14
In this article, I aim to do something different. I take seriously the Court’s
claim that it was protecting religion against discrimination and doing so under
the rubric of Smith, which, even on its face, forbids religious discrimination.
I accordingly refrain from suggesting that the Court was covertly (or overtly)
returning us to the world of Sherbert or to some more or less malign version
of that regime. Taking the Justices at their word, I analyze the Court’s
approach to the opposing parties in each of the two cases and assess that
approach for symmetry. The two cases offer excellent vehicles for assessing
symmetry because in each of the disputes, one side (petitioners) argued the
government discriminated against it based on religion by prohibiting it from
discriminating against a same-sex couple based on sexual orientation.
Because we have claims of discrimination on both sides of the two disputes,
one forming the predicate for the other, we can ask the following question:
What would the dispute look like if the Supreme Court took the approach that
it used to evaluate respondents’ conduct and applied it to petitioners’
conduct? In other words, I will take seriously the Court’s template for
discrimination based on religion and apply it to the behavior of the putative
13

See Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2612 (2020)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (quoting Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 49–50) (claiming that even under Smith, whenever government favors some
activities over others, “it must place religious organizations in the favored or exempt
category” absent a “sufficient justification”). For a sympathetic explication of this approach
in theory if not as practiced by the Supreme Court, see Nelson Tebbe, The Principle and
Politics of Equal Value, 121 COLUM. L. REV., 2397 (2021). See also Douglas Laycock, The
Broader Implications of Masterpiece Cakeshop, 2019 BYU L. REV. 167, 177 (arguing that
under the Court’s reasoning in Smith, religion should enjoy something akin to “most-favored
nation status” (quoting Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 49–51)).
14

401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, sec. 3(3),
105 Stat. 1071, 1071; see also James M. Dise, Religious Exemptions to Neutral Laws of
General Applicability and the Theory of Disparate Impact Discrimination, 6 COLUM. J. RACE
& L. 115, 118–19 (2016) (characterizing religious exemptions as implicitly protecting
against disparate impact); David Cole, A New Assault on Marriage Equality, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2020/12/03/new-assaultmarriage-equality/?lp_txn_id=1262059 (describing the petitioner's appeal in Fulton as a
request to extend religious protections to include disparate impact).
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victims of that discrimination. I shall refer to this approach, investigating
whether we have symmetry between how the Court looked at each of two
symmetrical discrimination claims in one case, as “mirror-image analysis.”
One might object that while the same-sex couples claimed that
Masterpiece Cakeshop and Catholic Social Services were discriminating
against them,15 Masterpiece Cakeshop and Catholic Social Services did not
claim that same-sex couples discriminated against the two businesses. The
claim was instead that the government, by applying the anti-discrimination
laws to petitioners without allowing a religious exemption, discriminated
against them.16 Accordingly, the government was unwilling to tolerate
discrimination by petitioners against same-sex couples, and petitioners said
this government position discriminated against religious people. And, the
objector might add, isn’t governmental discrimination in violation of the
Constitution more invidious (and, in a sense, “more unlawful”) than private
discrimination in violation of a statute?
Neither objection is persuasive. As to the first, when Masterpiece
Cakeshop and Catholic Social Services complained that the government was
discriminating against them, the government stood in the place of actual or
potential same-sex couples whose demands for equal treatment (backed up
by the law) struck MC and CSS as discriminatory because of its impact on
religious people. In other words, same-sex couples, through the government
that represented their legal rights, complained that MC and CSS were
discriminating based on sexual orientation, and MC and CSS complained in
turn that enforcing such anti-discrimination principles on behalf of same sex
couples itself discriminated against MC and CSS on the basis of religion.
As to the second objection, sometimes the Constitution requires more of
government actors than statutes require of private actors, but other times the
opposite is true. The Equal Protection Clause, under Washington v. Davis,17
prohibits only intentional discrimination by the government, while Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects private employees against not only
disparate treatment but also conduct with an unintentional disparate impact.18
We can therefore evaluate how the Supreme Court treats discrimination
15

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1725 (2018);
Fulton v. City of Phil., 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1875 (2021).
16

Supra note 5.

17

426 U.S. 229, 238–39 (1976).

18

Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e2 (as amended in 1991
by Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071).
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claims generally, whether those claims arise under the Constitution or under
a statute, and assess how faithfully the Court applies its own approach to
discrimination from one party to a case to another, without worrying about
the above objections to such analysis.
Victims can also be perpetrators. A baker can discriminate against same
sex couples looking to buy a wedding cake even as the government allegedly
discriminates against the religious baker by punishing him for discriminating
against same sex couples. What can make such contests coherent and logical
is that “discrimination” means more or less the same thing going each way.
If Jacob can be said to have committed an assault against Blythe while Blythe
is said to have committed an assault against Jacob, then we would want the
word “assault” to carry the same meaning for both confrontations, unless we
have a good reason to say that an assault means something different in each
context.
In analyzing Masterpiece Cakeshop and Fulton, I will examine ways in
which the meaning of “discrimination” differed when the actions were those
of the government on behalf of same-sex couples and against religion, versus
those of petitioners against same-sex couples. I will describe what the two
cases would look like were the Free Exercise definition of religious
discrimination to apply to sexual orientation discrimination. Finally, I will
provide a better understanding of the Court’s analysis purportedly applying
Smith and thus identifying religious discrimination under the circumstances
that presented themselves to the Court in the two cases, taking account of
how petitioners would fare under the analysis they successfully urged on the
Court. I will offer the hypothesis that the Court so strongly identified with the
religious petitioners in these cases that it failed to recognize bigotry against
sexual minorities, mistaking it for benign religious observance. By surfacing
such bigotry using the Court’s own tools for uncovering religious prejudice,
my method hoists the Court by its own petard.
Part I begins by describing the conflict that reached the Supreme Court
in Masterpiece Cakeshop. After briefly touching on the theory of
discrimination that animated the petitioner’s claim, I turn to the basis on
which the Court disposed of the case. I then use mirror-image analysis to
determine what the Court would have done if it had applied its definition of
discriminatory animus to the actions of petitioner, Masterpiece Cakeshop.
The Court’s understanding of animus appeared to rest on the harshness of the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s critique of Masterpiece Cakeshop’s
refusal to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex couple. The contrast between
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this definition of animus—as applied to the Commission—and the definition
of discrimination that the Court applied to Masterpiece Cakeshop is arresting.
It suggests that the Court was—perhaps unintentionally—manifesting the
sort of bigotry that it believed it was neutrally observing.
Part II addresses Fulton, describing the more developed sort of narrative
that would likely have faced the Court in Masterpiece Cakeshop if it had
reached the merits of the primary claims there. I apply mirror-image analysis
to Fulton to assess the crossclaim of discrimination that Philadelphia would
have been able to make on behalf of same-sex couples seeking to become
foster parents if the Court’s version of anti-queer discrimination were as
robust as its understanding of anti-religion discrimination. Using analogies
from different areas of the law, this section provides a clear picture of the
fun-house mirror that same-sex couples face in attempting to avoid religious
people’s discrimination against the couples based on sexual orientation.
Part III describes the most robust test of religious coercion that would
have applied under the regime that governed Free Exercise claims prior to
Smith. I once again use mirror-image analysis here, this time to highlight the
unrecognizably enhanced view of anti-religious coercion that the Court took
in reaching the results that it did in Fulton. I offer hypothetical examples of
similarly enhanced Free Exercise claims that a disempowered person,
adhering to a nontraditional religion, could make if the Court applied a
uniform definition of anti-religious coercion. A Conclusion follows,
reflecting on the lessons of mirror-image analysis.
I. MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP AND DISCRIMINATION ASYMMETRY
A. The Masterpiece Claim
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, a gay couple planning their nuptials
entered a bakery and asked to purchase a wedding cake.19 The individual
petitioner (and corporate owner of the bakery) told the couple that because
they were having a same-sex wedding, it would violate MC’s Christian
obligations to provide the cake they wanted.20 He would happily sell them

19
20

138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018).

Id. As a reminder, for simplicity I refer to either the individual or the bakery or both
by the term MC. Context provides a clear picture of that entity to which MC refers at any
time.
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rolls or other baked goods, but a wedding cake was out of the question.21 The
couple brought a lawsuit claiming discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation in violation of state law.22 If the couple were straight—if one of
the two people was a woman instead of a man—MC would have served them.
MC defended itself by invoking its religious observance, contending that by
obligating MC to sell a wedding cake to a same-sex couple, a transgression
of MC’s religion, the Colorado Civil Rights Commission (“the
Commission”) violated the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause, which
prohibits official discrimination based on religion.23
In addition to its religion claim, MC presented a free speech claim,
arguing that it should not have to communicate a message with which it
disagrees (that the marriage of two men warrants celebration) by creating a
same sex wedding cake.24 How best to answer this free speech question
depends on facts that never became entirely clear in the record. Did the couple
in question want a special cake indicating that two men were marrying? If so,
then MC’s free speech claim might be substantial. To see why, consider a
scene from Borat Subsequent Moviefilm, in which Sacha Baron Cohen as
Borat asks a baker to decorate a cake with the slogan “Jews will not replace
us.”25 A law that required the baker to accede to such a request would at least
implicate the baker’s free speech right not to speak. Likewise, so might a cake
decorated with written or artistic representations of a same-sex couple
marrying implicate this right.
However, the Masterpiece Cakeshop record does not clearly show that
the couple sought a bespoke cake. MC apparently refused the couple a cake
before knowing what sort of cake—pre-made generic wedding cake or

21

Id. at 1724.

22

Id. at 1723. Unlike other provisions of federal antidiscrimination law, the public
accommodations provision, Title II, does not bar sex discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (a)
(forbidding “discrimination . . . on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin” in
public accommodations). If the federal public accommodations statute did cover sex
discrimination, it would, ipso facto, also cover sexual orientation discrimination. See
generally Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (construing Title VII’s
prohibition on sex-based discrimination in employment as extending to discrimination based
on sexual orientation and gender identity).
23

Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 16.

24

Id. at 17.

25

BORAT SUBSEQUENT MOVIEFILM (Four by Two Films 2020).
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custom—they wanted.26 As far as MC knew, all that the couple (and the
government enforcing the law against discrimination) wanted was for MC to
sell the two men a generic wedding cake on the same terms as it would sell
one to any other marrying couple.
The religious claim is different, however. MC said it is Christian and
its religion opposes same-sex marriage.27 To compel MC to sell a wedding
cake to two men getting married would, according to MC, require MC to
violate its religious commitments. I shall say more about MC’s Free Exercise
argument when I take up the Fulton case, but for now, note that the Court did
not reach this question because it found in favor of MC’s religious
discrimination claim on other grounds.28
The Colorado Civil Rights Commission ruled in favor of the same-sex
couple over MC in its original claim.29 In separate comments that the
Commission did not disclaim, one commissioner stated:
Freedom of religion and religion has [sic] been used to justify all
kinds of discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery,
whether it be the holocaust, whether it be—I mean, we—we can list
hundreds of situations where freedom of religion has been used to
justify discrimination. And to me it is one of the most despicable
pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to use their religion to hurt
others.30
The Colorado state courts affirmed the Commission’s decision.31 Then
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Commission had exhibited antireligious animus, evidenced chiefly in the above quote, and that MC would
prevail over the marrying same-sex couple for that reason.32 The Commission
could, presumably, revisit the issue and decide it without evident animus, and
the Supreme Court might then be willing to evaluate the Commission’s new
opinion under the Free Exercise Clause.33
26

Brief of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission in Opposition at 9, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111).
27

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724.

28

Id. at 1732.

29

Id. at 1723.

30

Id. at 1729 (quoting Transcript of Colorado Civil Rights Commission Meeting, July
25, 2014, 11–12).
31

Id. at 1723.

32

Id. at 1732.

33

Id.
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B. The Court’s Reaction to a Triggering Analogy
Why did the Court believe that the Commission harbored animus
against religion? The content of the statement itself appears to be that the fact
that you are religious and act out of religious motives does not exempt your
conduct from criticism and condemnation and further, historically, we have
seen people invoke religion when carrying out atrocities. That statement is
surely true, so the objection cannot be that the Commission defamed religion.
What might have especially bothered the Court, though, was likely the
invocation of slavery and the Holocaust.
When someone offers these atrocities as examples of what people can do
in the name of religion, they perhaps betray a negative view of religion. Say,
for example, someone asks an observant Catholic why she has ash on her
forehead, and she says it is because she is Catholic and observes Ash
Wednesday. Imagine that her friend follows up by saying, “you know that a
lot of Catholic priests molested children and then were just moved to other
congregations to continue their abuse, so you don’t want to be doing
something just because religious Catholics do it!” The Catholic might feel
justifiably offended at that statement, even though it asserts facts. Putting ash
on one’s forehead is unobjectionable, so there is no need to reference Catholic
priests who have done horrible things or to invoke a specific and scandalous
example.
Refusing to sell a same-sex couple a wedding cake, however, is different
from placing ash on one’s forehead for the holiday. The former is hurtful and
exclusionary. It is probably for this reason that a commissioner saw fit to
bring up admittedly far more serious historical atrocities; refusing to engage
in commerce with a same-sex couple might have looked like it stemmed from
similarly antiquated and invidious bigotry that would have given rise to the
larger past injustices. From the point of view of the Supreme Court, however,
it appeared that MC had done nothing wrong or nothing especially hurtful—
in refusing to serve the same-sex couple—so long as the refusal was the
product of religious faith, particularly given that same sex couples could
easily find other bakers willing to serve them. From the Court’s perspective,
a comparison to atrocities could not have come from a genuine grievance, so
it must therefore have reflected animus against religion.
The Court was coming from a standpoint of tolerance for what MC did,
just as any sensible person would feel tolerance for the ash on the Catholic
woman’s forehead. No need, under these circumstances, to invoke historical
atrocities or misconduct. The Court thus might have viewed the putative
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perpetrator of sexual-orientation-based discrimination as engaged in
relatively anodyne conduct that should not have triggered any reference to
atrocities in the name of religion. Viewing things in this way, it would be
natural to conclude that the commissioner and therefore the Commission,
which failed to take issue with the bigoted statement, were in fact
discriminating against MC by speaking of atrocities justified in the name of
religion.34
For the Court to have viewed the commissioner’s words as comparable
to the above example required the Court to regard what MC did to the samesex couple with empathy. Why? Because unlike wearing ash on one’s
forehead, a place of public accommodation refusing to serve a couple because
the couple consists of two men or two women is illegal. The illegality under
state law of this private discrimination stems from the fact that many people,
apparently including Colorado lawmakers, believe it is morally wrong. It is
wrong for the same reason that race discrimination is wrong. It denies people
full participation in the marketplace on account of an invidious classification.
Such discrimination does not merely deny a person the opportunity to buy a
product, a denial for which some other willing vendor might be able to
compensate. It stigmatizes a person and makes him or her feel like an
outsider, an exile, a pariah. It also reinforces existing oppressive power
relationships at odds with American ideals of freedom and fairness. One of
the key attributes that recommends a capitalist “free market” over its
alternatives is that any willing customer can walk into any place of business
and expect to be served, regardless of race, sex, sexual orientation, religion,
or other characteristic.35
Freedom from the stigma of discrimination within the market, however,
did not, in the Court’s estimation, seem to register as a significant enough
liberty interest to merit the caustic reply that the commission issued (with the
Commission’s tacit approval) in response to the denial of that freedom.36 The
34

For an interesting contrast, see Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2417–23 (2018)
(holding that, despite the history of blatant and explicit anti-Muslim animus behind the
Trump travel ban against the entry of travelers and refugees from designated countries into
the United States, the cosmetic changes to the ban sufficed to validate it as something other
than the discriminatory measure that it plainly was).
35

See STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS
DECLINED, 64, 76–77 (2012) (asserting that “a free market puts a premium on empathy” and
that “[i]f you’re trading favors or surplus with someone, your trading partner suddenly
becomes more valuable to you alive than dead.”).
36

See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732.
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caustic reply therefore struck the Court as itself discriminatory, much as it
would have been discriminatory to mention atrocities by pedophiles and their
protectors in response to a Catholic having some ash on their forehead. The
Court’s empathy for MC was part of its approach to determining whether MC
was doing something wrong by refusing to sell a wedding cake to a same-sex
couple. In thinking about that question, the Justices in the majority in
Masterpiece Cakeshop seemed to betrayƒB. the view that if it was wrong to
refuse to sell a wedding cake to a same-sex couple, it was not all that wrong.37
It was not wrong enough to justify a response invoking prior religious
atrocities. Nothing like slavery or the Holocaust.
C. Masterpiece Cakeshop in the Mirror
Now let us apply mirror-image analysis. Imagine the Court taking a
similarly empathic stance toward the same-sex couple that came into MC’s
bakery for a wedding cake. The two men, maybe filled with excitement about
this next chapter in their lives, walk into the bakery. The shopkeeper
welcomes them and smiles. The two men know that not that long ago, the law
not only prevented them from marrying but authorized the police to arrest
them for their choice of partner, while police allowed themselves to do a
whole lot more.38 It feels good to be recognized as equal members of society.
The shopkeeper asks how he can help them. They grin and say they will be
wed and will need a cake for the occasion. They pay him a compliment,
saying they have heard that his cakes are beautiful and delectable.
MC is no longer smiling. He tells the men that he would be happy to sell
them a loaf of bread or rolls. But he cannot make them a wedding cake. “Why
not?” They ask. “We are willing to pay whatever it costs. We can afford it.”
“I am sorry,” he says, “but it violates my religion to sell you a wedding cake.”
One of the two men becomes visibly upset and says that the baker takes
money from people for wedding cakes all day. Why can’t he just do the same
for them? He does not even know them, after all. They are good people.
Seeing that the shopkeeper has made up his mind and will not budge, the
other of the two men says, “get ready for a lawsuit, pal. It is illegal to

37
38

See id.

Victoria A. Brownworth, Police violence is LGBTQ history, past and present, PHILA.
GAY NEWS (Apr. 14, 2021), https://epgn.com/2021/04/14/police-violence-is-lgbtq-historypast-and-present/.
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discriminate against us.” “I am not discriminating,” he assures them. “I am
just being a Christian.”
Mirror-image analysis asks that we take the same friendly approach to
the same-sex couple that the Court took to the baker. Doing so, we note how
very insulting and unkind it was to refuse service to the couple. We feel for
the men, just as the Court felt for the baker. It would be humiliating for
anyone to hear that a store open to the public would not serve them because
of their sexual orientation (or because of what amounts to the same thing,
their wish to marry someone of the same sex). A refusal to serve customers
based on sexual orientation also reinvigorates a properly receding oppressive
social structure that long denied LGBTQ+ citizens full access to, and
participation in, society.
Empathizing with the couple, we would ask whether the baker sincerely
believed that his religion prohibited him from selling a wedding cake to the
men. As a particular sort of Christian, he might believe himself to be
prohibited from having sex with a man, and he probably could not officiate
at a same-sex wedding because that would make him a quasi-partner in the
union. But was it truly the case that he could not sell a wedding cake to a
same-sex couple? We can suppose he believed in this interpretation, but
lending our generosity to the couple, as the Court did to the baker, we might
wish to consider whether MC treated some similarly situated sinners
differently, which seems likely (as discussed below), just as the
commissioner might have spoken less harshly of nonreligious actors who
violated antidiscrimination law. Indeed, one way to determine whether a
party is engaged in illicit discrimination is to examine how broadly that party
applies its own stated criterion in comparable situations.39 Let us accordingly
consider who else should have been unable to shop at the bakery.
39

See, e.g., Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 73 (2020)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (enjoining enforcement of occupancy limits in places of worship
because “New York’s restrictions on houses of worship not only are severe, but also are
discriminatory. . . . In a red zone, for example, a church or synagogue must adhere to a 10person attendance cap, while a grocery store, pet store, or big-box store down the street does
not face the same restriction.”); S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct.
716, 717 (2021) (Statement of Gorsuch, J.) (supporting the Court’s injunction against
enforcement of a prohibition on indoor worship services because “California has openly
imposed more stringent regulations on religious institutions than on many businesses.”);
Gateway City Church v. Newsom, No. 20A138, slip op. at 1 (Feb. 26, 2021) (similarly
granting injunctive relief against Covid regulations to religious institutions because the
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As a matter of Christian doctrine, as generally understood, people must
believe in God and must also believe that Jesus died for their sins. A failure
to believe is a sin.40 What if a straight couple walked into MC, and they were
wearing matching T-shirts featuring the Flying Spaghetti Monster? They
would thereby have designated themselves as atheists. It is sinful not to
believe in God and Jesus. Would the Christian baker sell the couple a
wedding cake? Absent evidence to the contrary, the answer is almost
certainly yes, notwithstanding religious objections to nonbelief.41
Next, imagine that a mixed-religion, straight couple came in. The man
was Christian and the woman was Jewish. They each wore jewelry indicating
their respective faiths. Christian sects assert a variety of views on interfaith
marriages, but let us suppose that this baker belongs to one that deems such
marriages sinful. Would he sell the couple a cake? Again, absent evidence to
the contrary, almost certainly yes.42 Third, imagine that a man and a woman
Court’s decision in S. Bay United Pentecostal Church “clearly dictated” the outcome);
Tandon v. Newsom, No. 20A151, slip op. at 3 (Apr. 9, 2021) (per curium) (likewise granting
injunctive relief against enforcement of a ban on at-home worship because “California treats
some comparable secular activities more favorably than at-home religious exercise.”).
Notwithstanding the Court’s analysis, however, the difference between the stores that were
allowed to remain open while churches were ordered to close ought to have been obvious to
the Court, given the fact that sitting in church involves prolonged exposure to large numbers
of people who are talking and singing, all of which dramatically raises the risk of droplet
transmission, while a visit to a market or “bus station[] and airport[], . . . laundromat[] and
bank[], . . . hardware store[] and liquor shop[],” Roman Catholic Diocese, 141 S. Ct. at 69
(Gorsuch, J., concurring), involves relatively brief exposure and relatively little talking, no
singing, and therefore a far more limited risk of droplet transmission. In other words, what
the Court described as like cases, discriminatorily treated differently, were quite plainly
unlike cases, properly treated differently. Id. at 65. These shadow docket decisions
demonstrate that the Court is sometimes very sensitive to the mere possibility of antireligious discrimination, even as it is at other times (in the case of the same-sex couples in
Masterpiece Cakeshop and Fulton as well as the Muslims in Trump v. Hawaii) oblivious or
indifferent to real and palpable discrimination.
40

John 16:9 (New King James), https://biblehub.com/john/16-9.htm (“[O]f sin, because
they do not believe in Me.”); CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, pt. 3, § 1, ch. 1, art.
8(II) (1851), https://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/__P6A.HTM (listing “unbelief” as
one of the “many forms” of sin).
41

Brief Amici Curiae of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., One
Colorado, and One Colorado Educational Fund in Support of Appellees at 4, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111) (describing
the baker’s “routine willingness to serve those of faiths different from his, as well as atheists
and interfaith couples”).
42

Id.
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came into the bakery and the woman was visibly pregnant, wearing a T-shirt
that says “a choice, not a child”—referring to abortion—on it. Most religious
Christians believe that abortion is tantamount to murder. Could our baker,
consistent with his beliefs, nonetheless sell a wedding cake to these
customers? Once again, we can assume, absent contrary evidence, that the
answer is yes, even assuming the baker personally holds the anti-abortion
views of his church.43 Why? Because common experience tells those of us
who have frequented the businesses of devout Christians that Christian
salespeople generally do not require their customers to conform their conduct
to the salesperson’s religion. Out of all the sinful people that might walk into
the bakery seeking to buy a wedding cake, then, so far as we know, MC
refuses wedding cakes only to people from the LGBTQ+ community.44
Recall the Court’s reaction to the commissioner having mentioned the
Holocaust and slavery to make a point about how people sometimes invoke
religion to justify evil acts. The Court plainly believed that to compare the
actions of MC in refusing to provide a same-sex couple with a wedding cake
to such atrocities was grossly disproportionate, so much so that it evidenced
animus against religion. A similarly empathic stance toward the same-sex
couple that visited the bakery would give rise to a corresponding sense that
refusing to sell the two men a wedding cake was insulting and
disproportionate relative to the fact that a couple planning to marry within
their sex had walked into a Christian’s bakery. We can tell that refusing to
sell them a wedding cake goes too far because opposite-sex couples with
sinful lifestyles walk into the bakery all the time and find a baker who is
happy to sell them a wedding cake.
Were MC to turn away every couple that rejects the beliefs, customs, or
marital directives of even mainstream Christianity, he would quickly find
himself out of customers. He therefore instead makes the uniquely insulting
choice to turn away business from a same-sex couple. That looks like anti-

43
44

See id.

Indeed, the only other apparent suit against MC for refusing service to a customer
also involved discrimination against the LGBTQ+ community; MC was again a defendant in
a suit over its refusal to sell a blue birthday cake with pink frosting to a transgender woman
after discovering that she sought to celebrate her transition. Scardina v. Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd., No. 2019CV32214, slip op. 1, 5 (Dist. Ct. Denver June 15, 2021). However,
it is worth noting that having to bake a special pink and blue cake to specification might be
different, for free speech purposes, from having to sell a same-sex couple a generic wedding
cake just as the baker would sell an opposite sex couple the same generic wedding cake.
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queer animus that tracks societal prejudice rather than simply fidelity to the
tenets of Christianity.
One might contend that out of all the sins that engaged couples commit
while getting married, the worst of all—from the point of view of some
version of Christianity—is homosexuality. If that is so, then the argument
that MC should have been excluding other sinners as well if it was excluding
same-sex couples for religious reasons might be weaker because MC would
no longer be treating like cases differently; it would instead be singling out
the most serious transgression for the most severe measure. On the other
hand, given the breadth and depth of Christianity, one might have reason for
skepticism regarding the sincerity of a claim that the core commitment of
Christianity is an opposition to homosexuality and to same-sex marriage.
Had the Supreme Court applied the sort of analysis to MC’s behavior
that it applied to the conduct of the Commission (and specifically to the words
of the commissioner) reviewing MC’s behavior, it would have said
something like the following: We believe that the Commission is
discriminating against religion because one of its commissioners (without
contradiction by others) speaks of religion as though it belongs in the same
conversation as slavery and the Holocaust, thereby treating unlikes alike, with
religion getting the short end of the stick. Analyzing MC’s behavior similarly,
we observe that MC is refusing to sell wedding cakes to same-sex couples
even as it sells wedding cakes to other couples whose planned wedded
lifestyles substantially deviate from what MC’s faith prescribes. By singling
out LGBTQ+ couples for exclusion from its wedding cake business, MC
therefore treats like cases differently, a move that signals discrimination in
just the way that treating distinct cases alike does. Though the Commission
would register as a wrongdoer, so would MC in its discriminatory conduct
for which religion here offers only an apparent but not an actual explanation,
given its underinclusive application.
Had the Supreme Court ignored the allegedly animus-based thinking of
the Commission, we would have a different sort of comparison to draw. Aside
from the free speech issue that I regard as potentially difficult, consider what
the conflict would look like. On one side would be the same male couple
walking into the bakery seeking the opportunity to purchase a wedding cake.
On the other side this time would be the application of anti-discrimination
law to a religious man who says he cannot sell a wedding cake to the samesex couple because doing so would violate his religious obligations. For MC
to prevail under Smith—the standard that the Court said it was applying and
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that we will therefore assume that it was applying—we would need to find a
way to construe the application of anti-discrimination law to MC as
discrimination against MC based on religion.
II. CATHOLIC SOCIAL SERVICES AND DISCRIMINATION ASYMMETRY
A. The Catholic Social Services Claim
To see how the conflict would work, let us turn to a case in which the
Supreme Court addressed what was essentially the same fight as we saw in
Masterpiece Cakeshop but on the merits. Fulton involved the foster care
system in Philadelphia. The city contracted with various private foster care
agencies to review and certify applicants for fostering children in the
system.45 If you wanted to foster children in Philadelphia, you could go to
one of the agencies, and it would review your qualifications and conclude
that you either were or were not qualified to be a foster parent.
One of the parties to the dispute was Catholic Social Services (“CSS”),
a foster care agency that had a contract with the city.46 CSS believed, as a
matter of religious faith, that marriage was a sacred bond between a man and
a woman.47 CSS accordingly refused to review and certify couples that were
unmarried or that consisted of two people of the same sex, even if they were
married.48 The city told CSS that if it did not drop its refusal to certify samesex married couples, the city would stop referring children to the agency and
refuse to enter future foster care contracts with CSS.49 CSS intended to
continue its bar against same-sex couples and brought a lawsuit claiming a
violation of its Free Exercise right to practice its religion without suffering
discrimination and seeking to enjoin the city from terminating its contract
with CSS.50

45

Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1875 (2021) (explaining that the city
“enters standard annual contracts with private foster agencies to place . . . children with foster
families” and that these foster agencies have “the authority to certify foster families” under
the law).
46

Id. at 1874.

47

Id. at 1875.

48

Id.

49

Id. at 1875–76.

50

Id. at 1876.
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The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of CSS, holding that, given the
city’s broad authority to grant exemptions from the prohibition against
discrimination, a refusal to grant such an exemption to a religious group
failed the “law of general applicability” test of Smith and had to meet strict
scrutiny, like any discriminatory burden upon religion.51 Because the City of
Philadelphia had the option of granting an exemption from the
antidiscrimination provision of the contract with CSS but evidently chose not
to grant such an exemption to CSS, the Court viewed enforcement of the
antidiscrimination provision as falling outside the category of neutral rules
that avoid triggering strict scrutiny. In the free speech context, for instance,
the Court has gone one step further and subjected a system of granting parade
permits—a system that gives the grantor complete discretion to deny permits
for whatever reason they like—to strict scrutiny (which the parade granting
system would likely fail) under the First Amendment.52
B. The Court’s Reaction to an Exemption & the Non-Discriminating
Alternatives
Let us consider how the Court thought about the facts such that it
ultimately concluded that Philadelphia had engaged in anti-religious
discrimination. Philadelphia had an ordinance as well as contract provisions
in foster-care-agency agreements that prohibited discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation.53 The city applied the contract provision to CSS by
refusing to do business with an entity that discriminated against same-sex
couples.54 The city could have granted (though it did not actually grant any)
exemption from the provision, and it is sometimes fair to worry that the
discretion to grant permits or exemptions could amount to a cover for
discrimination.55 In the context of an agreement organized around providing
51

Id. at 1916 (Barrett, J., concurring) (discussing Smith’s “law of general applicability”
test); id. at 1878 (majority opinion) (ruling in favor of CSS because the city’s nondiscrimination law was not generally applicable).
52

Id. at 1878.

53

Id. at 1875.

54

Id. at 1875–76.

55

The Court has, in other areas, treated a public official’s boundless discretion to decide
whether to grant or deny a privilege as tantamount to discrimination in the provision of that
privilege. In the context of freedom of speech, for example, the Court has invalidated speechlicensing schemes that afford the licensing official unlimited discretion to decide whether to
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foster care for children, however, the Court might have best exercised
constitutional avoidance and understood any discretion in applying
contractual rules as narrowly dedicated to furthering the interests of the foster
children. Given that the city had not yet exempted anyone from the provisions
prohibiting discrimination,56 it would have made sense to conclude that the
city would grant an exemption only if the needs of children in foster care
militated in favor of such an exemption.
One could imagine, for instance, that a trans foster child might best thrive
in the custody of a trans family rather than a cis family. Rejecting the second
for the first family would technically violate the provision prohibiting
discrimination based on gender identity.57 Thus, the apparently never-yetused exemption would perhaps be available for that kind of a case.
Understood in this way, the exemption would have nothing to do with
accommodating the agency or its special needs. The goal would be to meet
the needs of the children while generally avoiding discrimination.
Another context in which a related type of child-centered discrimination
might be appropriate is in the placement of African American children.58
Where the law prohibits race discrimination in adoption or foster care
placement, we nonetheless see social work agencies preferring African
American parents for fostering or adopting African American children.59 The
grant or deny a license. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150–
51 (1969) (parade licensing); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939) (leafletting
licensing). In the area of search and seizure too, the Court has held that when an officer, in
the absence of articulable individualized suspicion, singles out an individual motorist on the
road to ask for license and registration, the officer conducts an unreasonable seizure in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, though officers may lawfully erect a checkpoint and
stop every oncoming driver to ask for license and registration. The main difference between
the two is that in the first but not the second, the police exercise unbridled discretion. See
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). And in a later case, Michigan v. Sitz, 496
U.S. 444, 454-55 (1990), the Supreme Court, for similar reasons, approved a sobriety
checkpoint system in which every driver had to stop. The apparent elimination of discretion
removed the possibility of discrimination and thereby changed traffic stops from unlawful to
lawful under the Fourth Amendment.
56

Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1879.

57

PHILA. CODE § 9-1106(1) (2013).

58

Kristie Ann Rooney, Racial Matching vs. Transracial Adoption: An Overview of the
Transracial Adoption Debate, 53 J. MO. BAR 32, 32 (1997).
59

Id. at 33 (“[C]ourts and adoption agencies often practice a policy of racial matching
whereby they strive to place Black children with Black parents and discourage placement
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theory for this type of racial preference is that growing up African American
in our society is sufficiently distinct from growing up White that an African
American child might do better in the home of an African American couple
that can teach the child how to manage the particular struggles that face an
African American individual in the U.S. today.60 This practice is not without
controversy,61 but it stems from the view that on occasion, a race-neutral
approach to the placement of children could disserve a child’s best interests.
One might imagine a similar argument for placing hearing-impaired children
with a deaf family, and so on.62 Once again, by contrast to what CSS did—
accommodating its own spiritual or other needs—the interests of the agency
would play no role in justifying an exemption from the rules against
discrimination. The exemption would be for the children whose interests the
agency is supposed to be serving.
Although the exemption language in Philadelphia’s foster care contract
was broad and seemingly boundless, it would have been sensible to assume
that in carrying out its responsibilities toward the children, the exemption
would apply only if the children’s wellbeing at least arguably called for such
an exemption.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court saw the exemption provision very
differently. To understand the Court’s perspective, it is useful to recall a fact
that the Court highlighted in its opinion: other contracting agencies
evaluating foster care applications were willing to review a same-sex
couple’s qualifications, a willingness that meant that same-sex couples would
with white parents.”); Ezra E. H. Griffith & Rachel L. Bergeron, Cultural Stereotypes Die
Hard: The Case of Transracial Adoption, 34 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 303, 303 (2006)
(noting that despite “statutory efforts . . . meant to promote race-neutral approaches to
adoption . . . , the cultural preference for race-matching in the construction of families
remains powerfully ingrained”); Jessica M. Hadley, Note, Transracial Adoptions in America:
An Analysis of the Role of Racial Identity Among Black Adoptees and the Benefits of
Reconceptualizing Success Within Adoptions, 26 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC.
JUST. 689, 692 (2020) (pointing out that, despite prohibitions against the consideration of
race in adoptions, “some states have allowed race to be considered as one factor among many
others”).
60

Rooney, supra note 59, at 33 (citing NAT’L ASS’N OF BLACK SOC. WORKERS,
POSITION STATEMENT ON TRANS-RACIAL ADOPTIONS 2 (1972)).
61

Griffith & Bergeron, supra note 60, at 305 (“Race-matching has been and remains an
influential and controversial concept regarding how best to construct adoptive families.”).
62

Barbara White, When Deaf Parents Adopt Deaf Children: An Investigation of the
Concept of Adoptive Parent Entitlement in Deaf Adopted Families, JADARA, Oct. 2019, at
1.
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allegedly lose nothing from CSS’s refusal to consider their applications.63
From the Court’s perspective, CSS was doing the best it could, given its
religious commitments, and a same-sex couple would have had many other
agencies from which to choose.64 Indeed, no same-sex couple had ever asked
CSS to review their application to become foster parents.65 The Court thus
saw same-sex couples as having plenty of options for becoming eligible to
foster children, so long as they did not insist on being serviced by the one
agency that—due to religious commitments—was unable to offer its
services.66
Because alternative, non-discriminating, agencies were available, the
Court did not see the same-sex couple as suffering any real harm.67 CSS was
able to fulfill its religious requirements, and same-sex couples could become
foster parents by undergoing review with a different agency.68 CSS even
offered to help couples find another agency, thus manifesting its lack of
animus toward the couple.69 If CSS was doing everything it could, and if
same-sex couples could readily get what they wanted elsewhere, then only an
animus towards religion would lead the City of Philadelphia to terminate its
contract with CSS.70 Unlike a same-sex couple seeking to foster a child,

63

Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1886 (2021) (observing that according
to the record, if a same-sex couple were to approach CSS, “CSS would simply refer the
couple to another agency that is happy to provide that service—and there are at least 27 such
agencies in Philadelphia”) (citing App. 171; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 6, at
App. 137a).
64

See id. at 1886, 1930 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (mentioning that “dozens of other
foster agencies stand willing to serve same-sex couples”).
65

Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1886.

66

Id. (noting that, due to the plethora of other agencies serving same-sex couples in
Philadelphia, “not only is there no evidence that CSS’s policy has ever interfered in the
slightest with the efforts of a same-sex couple to care for a foster child, there is no reason to
fear that it would ever have that effect”).
67

Id.

68

Id.

69

Id. at 1930 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“CSS is committed to help any inquiring samesex couples find those other agencies”).
70

To be sure, the Court says it is not looking for animus as the test of a Free Exercise
violation but is instead faulting Philadelphia for applying a contractual provision that is not
generally applicable because the city reserves the right to offer exemptions but did not offer
one to CSS for its religiously motivated noncompliance. See id. at 1877. Still, the claim that
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moreover, CSS would suffer a serious setback from the termination of its
contract with the City of Philadelphia.
From the Court’s perspective, instead of appreciating and
acknowledging how well the Catholic agency had worked things out and
instead of accordingly going forward with all contracts intact, the City of
Philadelphia sought to punish the religious organization for its actions. Other
parties contracting with the city perhaps would not lose their contracts for
offering compromises and for trying to make everything go smoothly. Yet,
when a religious party was unwilling to stick to the contract when the
provision creating a conflict was an anti-discrimination rule that interfered
with the party’s religious beliefs, the city inflicted a discretionary, severe
penalty on the religious party.
The above description of what the City of Philadelphia did is how we
might most charitably construe the claim that the city did more than just fail
to accommodate religious practice. Such a failure would seem to violate
Sherbert or Christian privilege or a most-favored-nation approach if we lived
in the pre- or post-Smith universe. The Court’s view instead was that the city,
by retaining the authority to offer an exemption while simultaneously
refusing to grant such an exemption for religious reasons, effectively
discriminated against CSS because of its religion, a claim that falls within the
Smith standard.
the Court isn’t looking for animus is unpersuasive here. Part of why the Court highlights a
failure to grant an exemption to a religious actor is that the failure signals subjective animus
on the part of the government. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
for instance, where the Court applied Smith to strike down an animal sacrifice ordinance, the
existence of exceptions to the putatively neutral legal principle of furthering public health or
animal protection goals revealed the animus of the City of Hialeah, Florida, toward
practitioners of the Santeria religion. 508 U.S. 520, 542 (1993) (“[T]he pattern we have
recited discloses animosity to Santeria adherents . . . . [T]he texts of the ordinance were
gerrymandered with care to proscribe religious killings of animals but to exclude almost all
secular killings.”). If someone gets—or could get—an exemption from the rule for a nonreligious pursuit but the religious party gets no exemption for a religious pursuit, then the
government appears to be engaged in purposeful discrimination based on religion. See also
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493, 500 (1989) (asserting that the Court
must “‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race” by subjecting any legislation containing racial
classifications to strict scrutiny because “[r]acial classifications are suspect, and that means
that simple legislative assurances of good intention cannot suffice”); Jed Rubenfeld,
Affirmative Action, 107 Yale L.J. 427, 436–37 (1997) (describing “[h]eightened scrutiny of
a racial classification” as “a test of ulterior state interests,” which functions “to smoke out
illegitimate purposes” and “permits a court to conclude, in effect, ‘[i]f the state were really
interested in race-neutral purpose x, it would not have done what it did’”).
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We caught a hint of the Court’s perspective on the conflict during oral
argument. Justice Kavanaugh said to Neal Katyal, the lawyer representing the
City of Philadelphia, that the city “was looking for a fight . . . even though no
same-sex couple had gone to CSS,” characterizing the city’s position as
“absolutist and extreme.”71 According to Justice Kavanaugh’s line of
questioning, making extreme demands of a religious entity that would require
the entity to violate its own faith sounds a lot like anti-religious
discrimination. Further, people need to be able to work together, as working
together is a sign of mutual respect. Here, CSS was prepared to work with
any same-sex couple to find an agency better suited to the couple’s needs.
And any same-sex couple that might have come to CSS for an evaluation
should have been willing, in the interests of cooperation and religious
tolerance, to go to a different agency to form their family. Thus, the city
taking the extreme position that it did, reflected an anti-religious sentiment.
A win-win solution was available, and Philadelphia, on behalf of same-sex
couples looking to foster children, chose to reject that solution and instead to
seek a win-lose proposition, thereby manifesting hostility to religion.72
C. Catholic Social Services: Coercion in the Mirror
Now let us conduct mirror-image analysis. What if the Court had applied
this sort of reasoning—the reasoning that allowed it to identify anti-religious
discrimination by Philadelphia against CSS—in analyzing the same-sex
couple’s predicament? As in the Masterpiece Cakeshop scenario, we might
have a gay couple, this time seeking the opportunity to foster one of the many
children living without the support of either parent. Many sincere and kind
people become foster parents because they are generous and wish to share
their home with a child in need, perhaps in preparation for adopting the same
or a different child. They might feel good about what they are doing,
especially because their actions will also save a child from the unscrupulous
individuals who sometimes become involved in the foster care system.
The hypothetical couple might approach one of the agencies hired by the
government to carry out what is essentially a government function: to review

71

Oral Argument at 1:16:10—17:24, Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (No. 19-123) (Kavanaugh,
J.), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-123.
72

Id. at 1:15:41–15:54 (Kavanaugh, J.) (“There are strong—very strong feelings on all
sides that warrant respect. And it seems like we and governments should be looking, where
possible, for win-win answers.”).
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the couple and determine whether they are qualified to foster a child. The
couple would walk in the door and find a receptionist who might look from
one to the other and then shake her head, confirming that they are a same-sex
couple and explaining that the agency is Catholic but that she could give the
couple a list of other agencies that would serve a same-sex couple.
“What’s the problem?”, one member of the hypothetical couple would
ask, while the other remembers how things were not so long ago, when
bullying queer people was even more widely accepted and prevalent. This
member of the couple feels herself returning to earlier traumas but tries to
remain present. Maybe she and her partner are the wrong age? The
receptionist confirms their worst fears and says the agency would not
evaluate them as foster parents because they are a same-sex couple. The first
woman assures the receptionist that the two of them are eager to take good
care of a child in need, that they have a peaceful and loving home, a big yard
where the child could play, and a marvelous kitchen for baking cookies and
cupcakes and preparing healthier snacks as well. And the child would have a
dog, a lab-shepherd mix who has qualified as an emotional support animal
and is gentle and friendly and playful.
The receptionist begins to look bored. She explains that none of those
things matter. What matters is that the couple is made up of two women, and
under Catholicism, only people of the opposite sex are supposed to marry and
form a sacred union, not two people of the same sex.
The hypothetical receptionist at this point might once again offer to
direct the couple to an agency that does not regard same-sex relationships as
sinful and disqualifying. The couple leaves, dejected. They had believed
things had changed.
The same-sex couple is warm, kind, and everything else a child could
want in foster parents and, indeed, in permanent parents. An agency
committed fully to the function delegated to it would have moved with
alacrity to get the process moving so that a child in need could find comfort,
safety, and happiness, perhaps for the first time in her life. And note that just
as Philadelphia did not even consider granting CSS an exemption from the
anti-discrimination requirement, CSS did not even consider making an
exception to its rule against reviewing same-sex couples for people who
would have offered a child a wonderful home and everything that a child
could wish for.
CSS, moreover, did arguably offer a different exception to its rule
rejecting sinful families. The exception would have applied to virtually every
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couple that failed to embrace a Catholic lifestyle in some way other than
living with an opposite-sex partner, without benefit of marriage, or living
with a same-sex partner with or without the benefit of marriage. And what
exactly would have violated the agency’s Catholic faith about evaluating a
same-sex couple? Saying that the couple is qualified under the rules to foster
a child? Treating two women as though they could give a child a safe and
supportive environment?
Consider a parallel to the Court’s focus on what the hypothetical samesex couple (represented by the City of Philadelphia) could have done instead
of insisting on being evaluated by the Catholic Agency. Think instead about
CSS’s alternative course of action. In place of refusing to evaluate any samesex couples, CSS could have completed an evaluation and then written on the
qualification form that CSS, as a matter of its religion, rejects the practice of
same-sex marriage. Then no one would make the mistake of attributing
endorsement or even tolerance of different lifestyles to CSS. Picking up on a
proposal in the city’s brief, Justice Breyer made this suggestion to CSS’s
attorney during oral argument,73 but the lawyer rejected the proposed
compromise out of hand.74 And in the majority opinion, the Court said that
CSS believed that approving a home for foster children constituted an
endorsement of the couple’s relationship, a view that the Chief Justice said
we must accept even if it is illogical; a view that seemed to manifest the very
sort of rigidity and unwillingness to compromise that the Court identified
with the City of Philadelphia.75
The Court apparently believed as well that a same-sex couple’s ability to
go to a different agency, and CSS’s willingness to assist them in doing so,
neutralized any discrimination. But is that a reasonable belief? Would a foster
care agency that barred African American couples or mixed-race couples be
treating such couples neutrally and equally just so long as the discriminating
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Id. at 0:06:48–07:00 (Breyer, J.) (referring to the city’s brief and telling CSS’s lawyer
that CSS could “add something onto any response you make and say that you do not endorse
same-sex marriages”).
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See id. at 0:07:24–07:45 (response of Lori. H. Windham) (pointing to the lower court
record to assert that from the perspective of CSS, “a home study is essentially a validation of
the relationships in the home”).
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Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1876 (“CSS believes that certification is tantamount to
endorsement. And ‘religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or
comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.’” (quoting Thomas
v. Rev. Bd. of the Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981)).
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agency was willing to direct them to an agency that did not discriminate?
Does discrimination only “count” when everyone discriminates?
Furthermore, if CSS truly believed that its religion prevented it from
evaluating the foster-parent qualifications of people who violate Catholic
religious dogma, then why did it single out same-sex couples? After all, most
people—and therefore, probably, most people who seek to become foster
parents—are not Catholic or at least do not obey the requirements of
Catholicism in their homes. Did CSS refuse to evaluate lapsed Catholics,
religious Protestants, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and atheist couples
because they do not observe Catholic rules of conduct or believe what
Catholics are supposed to believe?
How about mixed Catholic/non-Catholic couples? And couples who
slept together before they were married? What of couples that include a
woman who made the decision to terminate a pregnancy and stands by that
decision? And couples in which the male masturbates from time to time,
thereby spilling his seed in violation of Biblical law?76 How about
heterosexual couples that engage in sodomy? And if CSS would not know
which couples were sinful because their sins were hidden, then did CSS at
least hand people a list and ask that if they answered “yes” to any of the
questions (“Does the would-be foster father masturbate? Does the would-be
foster mother have in her possession the morning-after pill?”)? Do they
suggest another agency to evaluate those sinners?
I suspect that CSS did not hand out a list of this kind. Why not? Because
somehow, out of all the sins of married potential foster parents in which CSS
would allegedly be complicit by evaluating their qualifications to be foster
parents, only same-sex marriages made the cut. Applying the most-favorednation approach symmetrically would thus lead to the conclusion that CSS
was not evenhandedly applying its religious tenets but rather disfavoring—
discriminating against—same-sex couples, treating them as a “least favored
nation.”
There exist, it turns out, state laws that function—within this argument
about selective (discriminatory) religious practice—as a double-edged
sword: they bring into sharp relief the comparative dishonesty of CSS’s
policy regarding same-sex couples, but they also unveil the shocking
76

Genesis 38:9–10 (King James), https://www.bible.com/bible/1/GEN.38.9-10.KJV
(“And Onan knew that the seed should not be his; and it came to pass, when he went in unto
his brother's wife, that he spilled it on the ground, lest that he should give seed to his brother.
And the thing which he did displeased the LORD: wherefore he slew him also.”).
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potential of what the Supreme Court has now blessed for religious people
who contract with the government to carry out government functions like the
evaluation of would-be foster parents.
As of 2019, eight states had laws in place that allowed contracting
agencies to use an expansive list of religious criteria to exclude foster-parent
applicants, criteria that were not always Catholic-friendly.77 In South
Carolina, for instance, a private agency screened out Catholics, Muslims,
Buddhists, Hindus, atheists, agnostics, and Jews.78 Not a model of subtlety,
the initial screening form asked for “contact information of your pastor”
along with the potential parent’s “testi[mony] to [her] salvation.”79
The potential breadth of complicity-based refusals to serve a couple
wishing to foster a child thus goes well beyond LGBTQ+ people and reaches
even those who practice the same religion that the Court in Fulton bent over
backwards to accommodate. In one respect, such agencies are therefore even
worse than CSS, which only refuses queer couples, because it excludes so
many more people. But in another respect, CSS is worse because it treats
similarly situated parties—those whose family lives conflict with the dictates
of Catholicism—differently, with most sinners arbitrarily spared exclusion.
Treating like cases differently is the definition of discrimination.
Selecting in the way that CSS did therefore manifests prejudice against sexual
minorities and exposes as false the claim that excluding same-sex couples
simply reflects sincere dedication to religious requirements. An empathic
stance toward the same-sex couples seeking to foster a child would have, first,
identified sexual-orientation-based animus in CSS for its failure to exclude
most other married couples who failed to embrace the religious principles of
Catholicism, and it would simultaneously have considered the potential
breadth of complicity-based arguments for many groups beyond sexual
minorities.
77

Lydia Currie, I was barred from becoming a foster parent because I am Jewish,
JEWISH
TELEGRAPHIC
AGENCY
(Feb.
5,
2019,
5:46
PM),
https://www.jta.org/2019/02/05/opinion/i-was-barred-from-becoming-a-foster-parentbecause-i-am-jewish; Equality Maps: Religious Exemption Laws, MOVEMENT
ADVANCEMENT
PROJECT,
https://www.lgbtmap.org/equalitymaps/religious_exemption_laws (last visited July 24, 2021) (listing states with current
religious exemption laws allowing state-licensed agencies to discriminate).
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Currie, supra note 78.

Brief of ADL (Anti-Defamation League) and Other Organizations as Amici Curiae
in Support of Respondents at 7 n.7, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021)
(No. 19-123) (quoting Currie, supra note 77).
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III. EXTRAVAGANT CLAIMS AND COERCION ASYMMETRY
A. The Scope of the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise Perspective
We have, up until now, focused largely on the Supreme Court’s
discrimination analysis as applied to those enforcing Colorado Civil Rights
law and those trying to enforce a contract provision prohibiting sexual
orientation discrimination in Philadelphia. We have seen that when we apply
the Court’s standard for identifying (religious) discrimination by respondents
to the parties originally charged with sexual orientation discrimination, the
petitioners, we find straightforward discrimination against same-sex couples
and a rather weak defense of purely religiously motivated action. It is fair, in
addition to noting the drastic under-inclusiveness of MC’s refusal to sell
wedding cakes to, and CSS’s exclusion of, LGBTQ+ couples, to ask how
exactly the two entities would have transgressed against their religion by
serving same-sex couples in the ways that they refused to do. In answering
this question, we might consider what it would mean for the other side of
each litigation to make similar demands of the religious parties, the
petitioners.
Until recently, Free Exercise claims at their most robust typically
identified some way in which a religious person or entity would have to
commit a sin if they conformed their conduct to the law or to the requirements
of a public workplace or an institutional setting. For example, a religious Jew
might complain that Sunday closing laws forced him to choose between
violating his Sabbath and being unable to compete with Christian vendors
who work six days a week (the Jew would unfortunately lose that case under
Braunfeld v. Brown80 and McGowan v. Maryland).81 Or a Muslim employee
might want lighter tasks during the period of Ramadan or might want to be
allowed to grow a beard despite a rule requiring employees to be cleanshaven. Even Hobby Lobby simply demanded the right not to offer health
insurance covering contraceptives prohibited by the proprietors’ religion—
80

366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961) (rejecting Jewish merchants’ Free Exercise challenge to a
statute mandating that stores close on Sundays because the legislation “imposes only an
indirect burden on the exercise of religion”).
81

366 U.S. 420, 459, 452 (1961) (holding that a statute proscribing certain work on
Sunday does not violate the Establishment Clause because the state has the power to “set one
day apart from all others as a day of rest,” and “[i]t would seem unrealistic . . . to require a
State to choose a common day of rest other than that which most persons would select of
their own accord”).
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morning-after birth control that they (erroneously) believed functioned as an
abortifacient.82 None of these cases involved the right of a public
accommodation to refuse service to people because those people did not
follow the dictates of the religious person’s faith.83
To get a sense of what the religious parties’ successful Free Exercise
claims would look like in the hands of a nontraditional claimant, consider a
person who subscribed to ethical veganism as a part of Jainism, a religion that
emphasizes “ahimsa” or nonviolence.84 Say this person, whom we’ll call
“Veronica,” considered homosexual activity innocuous but believed the
consumption of animal products like chicken, beef, or cheese to be sinful,
harmful, and wrong because it requires the torture and killing of sentient
living beings. Assume Veronica worked in a prison and was required to stay
in the main building for most of her 12-hour shift. A sensible Free Exercise
claim from Veronica might be one in which she asked her government
employer to either supply her with vegan food at lunch or allow her to bring
82

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 683, 702 (2014) (explaining that
Hobby Lobby “believe[d] that life begins at conception and that it would violate
their religion to facilitate access to contraceptive drugs or devices that operate after that
point,” including, as their fellow petitioners specified, “‘morning after’ pills”); James
Trussell, Elizabeth G. Raymond & Kelly Cleland, Emergency Contraception: A Last Chance
to Prevent Unintended Pregnancy 6 Contempt. Readings L. & Soc Just. 7, 16 (2014)
(explaining that studies show that morning-after pills, or emergency contraceptive pills, “are
not abortifacient” because they “do not interrupt an established pregnancy”).
83

To be sure, Hobby Lobby was making a similar complicity argument. However, by
covering insurance for contraceptives, the employer purchasing the coverage would have a
better claim of having had to participate in the sinful activity (using the contraceptives) than
an agency that refuses to evaluate non-sex-related attributes of two men or two women for
foster parent status has of having had to participate in same-sex sexual relations or marriage.
The Court in Fulton denies that CSS functions as a public accommodation because it is very
selective rather than welcoming all comers. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1880 (stating that “foster
care agencies do not act as public accommodations in performing certifications” because
“[c]ertification is not ‘made available to the public’ in the usual sense of the words” (quoting
Phila., Pa., Code § 9-1102(1)(w) (2016))). However, the Court here describes things at too
high a level of generality. The agency is supposed to welcome everyone who shows up for
an evaluation. Its selectivity should happen only once the evaluation begins, and some people
prove to be more qualified to serve as foster parents than others. It is not a matter of equal
outcomes but of equal opportunity.
84

M. Varn Chandola, Dissecting American Animal Protection Law: Healing the
Wounds with Animal Rights and Eastern Enlightenment, 8 WIS. ENV’T L.J. 3, 22 n.181
(2002) (quoting Susan L. Goodkin, The Evolution of Animal Rights, 18 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 259, 283–85 (1987)).
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her own outside vegan food into the penitentiary despite, let us say, a general
rule against outside food. To refuse Veronica is to compel her to violate her
religion or go hungry for her entire shift.
If Veronica were like CSS, however, she might go much further and say
that working in a prison and performing services with and for guards and
prisoners who would be eating animal products in the building violated her
religion. Veronica might explain that she, as a prison employee who
sometimes had to take prisoners and guards from place to place on a bus,
viewed busing prisoners to a building for a flesh-centered meal, for instance,
as an endorsement of their flesh consumption in violation of her religion. She
might accordingly demand that the prison serve only vegan food to prisoners.
In truth, any ethical vegan would regard this idea as wonderful, but the
question here is whether it would violate the Free Exercise Clause for the
government to refuse to accommodate Veronica in this extravagant way, for
the prison only to give her a vegan allowance (whether by supplying vegan
food to Veronica or by giving her permission to bring in her own vegan food)
but for it to continue to serve flesh, eggs, and dairy to prisoners and guards.
It would not even occur to any court to regard the latter as a Free Exercise
violation, no matter how strongly Veronica might believe she is endorsing
carnism85 by bringing prisoners or guards to a building where they will
consume the remains of slaughtered creatures and their reproductive
secretions. If Veronica could not handle doing her job in a nonvegan
workplace, then she would need to find another job.
In a far less ambitious program, WeWork, a commercial real estate
company that designs and builds shared spaces for entrepreneurs and
companies, announced in 2018 that it would no longer be serving red meat,
pork, or poultry at company functions and would not reimburse employees
for spending money on these foods for lunch meetings and the like.86
Employees were still free to buy their own meat, but WeWork would not be
paying for it. Still, the reaction was fast and furious.
In a New York Times article titled “Memo From the Boss: You’re a
Vegetarian Now,” David Gelles referred to WeWork’s policy as a vegetarian
mandate and claimed in the first line that “WeWork is no longer a safe space
85

According to Dr. Melanie Joy, “[c]arnism is the belief system that conditions us to
eat certain animals.” MELANIE JOY, WHY WE LOVE DOGS, EAT PIGS, AND WEAR COWS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO CARNISM 30 (10th Anniversary ed. 2020).
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Sara Ashley O'Brien, WeWork Is Banning Meat, CNN BUSINESS (July 13, 2018),
https://money.cnn.com/2018/07/13/technology/wework-meat-ban/index.html.
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for carnivores.”87 The policy did not even involve vegetarianism (fish was
permissible), but “carnivores” were very upset because they felt that a third
party was interfering with their choices on moral (environmental) grounds.88
One could only imagine how people would react to the workplace veganism
mandate I described above, but the backlash would surely be intense.
For similar reasons, few would tolerate an observant Jew demanding that
the Post Office where he worked provide or allow only matzoh and other
Kosher-for-Pesach food during the holiday of Passover. To argue that it
would violate the Free Exercise Clause for the Post Office to permit bread on
the premises or to serve the bread (or foods made from bread) to employees
would be frivolous. No one has the right to coerce other people to abide by
their religion as a matter of Free Exercise, no matter what they believe.
When a petitioner holds to a nontraditional faith, we see this point
immediately. And yet, perhaps because the petitioners in Masterpiece
Cakeshop and Fulton were both Christian, we (or at least our Supreme Court)
could easily miss the fact that petitioners were coercing non-Christians to
conduct their own lives in a Christian fashion, notwithstanding the Court’s
insistence that CSS “does not seek to impose [its religious] beliefs on anyone
else.”89 If people may not use your government-contracted services unless
they conform their conduct to the requirements of your religion, then you are
engaged in religious coercion on behalf of the government. Same-sex couples
seeking to become foster parents would reasonably view such conduct as
coercive, and yet the Supreme Court upheld the evident coercion under the
Free Exercise Clause. Seen in this light, Masterpiece Cakeshop and Fulton
vindicated a right of Christians to impose traditional versions of Christianity
on potential wedding cake customers (because the holding, if they had
reached the merits, was rather clear) and potential foster parents.
Worse, the petitioners were not even neutrally imposing their own
religion on the public. Applying the same searching approach to CSS that the
Court used in assessing Philadelphia’s behavior, we have seen that CSS was
in fact engaged in anti-queer discrimination rather than simply in the Free
Exercise of religion. CSS selectively applied its “no sinners welcome here”
lifestyle restriction by failing to exclude all the other lifestyle and relationship
“sinners” that applied to become foster parents.
87

David Gelles, Memo from the Boss: You’re a Vegetarian Now, N.Y. TIMES (July 22,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/20/business/wework-vegetarian.html.
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Id.
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Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1882 (2021).
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On top of its under-inclusiveness problem, CSS’s behavior manifested
over-inclusiveness by rejecting the same-sex couple outright rather than
simply expressing its view of same-sex unions on the qualification form. Its
preferred approach visited excessive harshness upon the fostering applicants
in that way, just as Justice Kavanaugh stated during the argument (and, one
suspects, a majority of the Court thought but did not include in the final
opinion) that insisting on CSS’s services was unnecessarily demanding and
harsh given the option of going to other agencies.90
B. Mirror-Image Analysis of the Court’s Free Exercise Perspective
What if we again employed the kind of mirror-image analysis that helped
us better understand the discrimination claims that each religious party
brought to the Supreme Court? That process would have us first assume
arguendo that it was sensible to extend First Amendment Free Exercise
protection to a religious person’s or entity’s prerogative to refuse service to
people whose lifestyles violated the religion of that person or entity, thereby
avoiding the appearance of endorsing the prohibited relationship.
In keeping with mirror-image analysis, we thus consider things from the
same-sex couple’s perspective in each of the two cases we have studied. What
would the same-sex couples have had to want from MC and CSS,
respectively, to mirror what the two religious entities successfully demanded
of the couples? I would argue the following: If either of the couples was in
business—for example, selling health insurance—then the couple would
have had to have asked for the baker in MC or for the individuals working at
CSS to marry people of the same-sex to qualify for the purchase of health
insurance.
The above might sound like hyperbole but consider the following: MC
refused to sell a wedding cake to a same-sex couple getting married. MC
would sell other baked products to the same-sex couple,91 but only a marrying
heterosexual couple could qualify for the privilege of buying a wedding cake
90

Id. at 1886 (emphasizing that “there are at least 27 [other] agencies in Philadelphia”
that would be “happy to provide . . . service” to queer couples (citing App. 171; Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 6, at App. 137a)).
91

In refusing to serve them, MC told the couple “I’ll make your birthday cakes, shower
cakes, sell you cookies and brownies, I just don’t make cakes for same sex weddings.”
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 (2018)
(quoting Joint Appendix at 152, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16111)).
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from MC. Accordingly, MC’s wedding cake policy, by withholding wedding
cakes from same-sex couples, pressured gay men and lesbians to marry
people of the opposite sex, much in the way that one of the couples selling
health insurance in our hypothetical case would be pressuring MC and CSS
personnel to marry people of the same sex as a condition of purchasing
insurance. No one would honor an entitlement to deny people insurance
unless they form a same-sex couple. Yet MC and CSS could, with the
Supreme Court’s all-but-certain blessing, subject same-sex couples to
traditional Christian demands that the couples likely found offensive, sexist,
and homophobic, as a constitutionally protected prerequisite to service.
Similarly, CSS would not evaluate a couple for foster-parenting unless
the couple consisted of a married man and woman. Single people could apply
to be foster parents, to be sure, but then the “single person’s” partner would
not be the child’s foster parent and could not fully perform the functions of
an approved foster parent. Moreover, since certification as a foster parent
often involves assessment of the entire household and the relationships in it,
a person in a queer relationship attempting to circumvent an agency’s bar
against queer couples by applying to be a single foster parent might not be
certified for the same reasons the agency refused to certify queer married
couples to begin with.92
CSS was thus applying pressure to people in same-sex couples to instead
marry people of the opposite sex to qualify for the privileges of foster parents.
It would accordingly be parallel for one of the couples to refuse to sell health
insurance to opposite-sex couples, creating pressure on straight couples to
marry people of the same sex. It might be tough to identify a religion that
demanded homosexuality in the way that Catholicism required
heterosexuality. But an individual could have personal reasons other than
religion for manifesting preferences for some people over others.
An LGBTQ+ group might refuse to sell their highly desirable wooden
furniture to traditional couples, requiring that a customer manifest the
92

Under New York law, for instance, foster agencies will conduct background checks
on all people over 18 years old residing in a foster parent’s household when deciding whether
to certify the foster parent or renew their certification, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18,
§ 443.8(a) (2021). Foster parents must inform agencies of marital status and family
composition. Id. § 443.3(b)(13). Likewise, in Pennsylvania, agencies also evaluate the entire
foster family and consider such factors as “community ties with family” and “[e]xisting
family relationships” in certification determinations. 55 PA. CODE § 3700.64(a)(3), (b)(1)
(2021). So, if an agency has homophobic biases to begin with, it is unlikely to certify a single
person in a queer relationship as a foster parent, even if they do not apply as a couple.
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lifestyle of a sexual minority to qualify for service. A straight couple could,
of course, take their business elsewhere, to someone who did not condition
service on sex-based characteristics. But the fact that not everyone made
prejudiced demands would not excuse the prejudice and discrimination of
those who did.
This mirror-image analysis offers us a reductio ad absurdum. No samesex couple would dream of going into court and defending an insistence that
would-be customers engage in unconventional sexual relationships as a
condition of service. The very idea is ludicrous.
Indeed, no same-sex couple would even want such a thing. Despite
defamatory claims to the contrary,93 same-sex couples typically just ask for
the right to have their chosen relationships without outside interference or
harassment and have no interest in compelling or even persuading straight
people to join the LGBTQ+ community.94 Yet the extremity of such a
hypothetical and utterly counterfactual request—or demand—exposes the
extravagance of what MC and CSS were in fact successfully demanding: a
Free Exercise right to force same-sex couples to act like religious Catholics
(and therefore to marry people of the opposite sex) as a prerequisite to
engaging in ordinary commerce at a bakery and to receiving certification as
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Anthony Niedwiecki, Save Our Children: Overcoming the Narrative that Gays and
Lesbians Are Harmful to Children, 21 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 125, 151 (2013); Timothy
J. Dailey, Homosexuality and Child Sexual Abuse, THE LANTERN PROJECT,
http://lanternproject.org.uk/library/general/articles-and-information-about-sexual-abuseand-its-impact/homosexuality-and-child-sexual-abuse/ (last visited Jul. 8, 2021) (claiming
that homosexuality and pedophilia are connected and that employment protection for gay
teachers therefore makes children vulnerable to be “‘recruited’ into adopting a homosexual
identity and lifestyle”); Peter Sprigg, Homosexuality in Your Child’s School, FAMILY
RESEARCH COUNCIL (2006) (“[S]ince directly promoting acceptance of homosexuality or of
sexual activity by students would be controversial, pro-homosexual activists routinely deny
or downplay those aspects of their agenda.”).
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See Evelyn Schlatter and Robert Steinback, The Southern Poverty Law Center, 10
INTELLIGENCE
REPORT
(Feb.
2011),
Anti-Gay
Myths
Debunked,
THE
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2011/10-anti-gay-mythsdebunked (referring to “the alleged plans of gay men and lesbians to ‘recruit’ in schools” as
a “myth” or “fairy tale[]” that merely “provided fodder for the[] crusade” of the anti-gay
right); HBO: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, Uganda and Pepe Julian Onziema Pt. 1,
YOUTUBE, at 12:20 (June 30, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G2W41pvvZs0
(showing a clip from the Ugandan NBS television show The Morning Breeze in which queer
activist Pepe Julian Onziema stated, “there is no such thing as recruitment of young people
or adults or anything like that.”).
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qualified foster parents by an agency contracting with the city in which the
couple lived.
The closest thing to a Free Exercise right to impose one’s religion on
another person is what parents may do when they raise children in their
chosen faith. Parents can insist that their children behave in the manner
dictated by the parents’ religion, and parents may also punish children who
defy their parents and who refuse to conform their conduct to religious
teachings. It is a right of discipline and indoctrination. In Wisconsin v.
Yoder,95 the Supreme Court held that Amish parents had a Free Exercise right
to take their children out of public school after the eighth grade, reasoning
that secondary school offered programs and embraced values that were “in
sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of life mandated by the Amish
religion.”96
In a partial concurrence and partial dissent, Justice William O. Douglas
pointed out that some Amish children might want to expose themselves to the
ideas they would encounter in high school and that denying them that
opportunity because of their parents’ religion protected parental
indoctrination at the expense of children’s freedom.97 Justice Douglas’s
vision of religious freedom—one that respected a minor’s wishes
notwithstanding a conflicting parental agenda—remains largely unfulfilled.
Increasingly, the Court has given effect to its mirror image, and not just with
respect to minors.
Notably, all the parties to the recent Free Exercise cases discussed in this
article are adults. On one side, the government looked after the equality rights
of adults attempting to purchase a wedding cake from a place of public
accommodation and of adults trying to foster children in need without
confronting discrimination based on sexual orientation. On the other side,
adults asserted a religious right that encompassed discrimination against
same-sex couples because the latter adults failed to adhere to the religion of
the former adults. However, we might choose to handle parent-child conflicts
over religion, we must recognize that no adult in this country rightfully holds
an entitlement, in the name of religious freedom, to impose the demands of
her faith upon another adult.
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CONCLUSION
The Court’s Free Exercise doctrine has always allowed courts to assess
the sincerity of a claimant’s assertion of religious faith as a reason for their
behavior. A religious group called the Neo-American Church that embraced
the motto “Victory over Horseshit!” was insincere, in the estimation of a
district judge who thought the group a front for people seeking to circumvent
the drug laws.98 MC’s and CSS’s assertions of faith as the reason for their
exclusion of same-sex couples from the opportunity to buy a wedding cake
and from evaluation for foster parenthood, respectively, were insincere as
well. Their actions were substantially underinclusive relative to the many
other people who buy wedding cakes from MC and undergo evaluation by
CSS without needing to conform their conduct to MC’s and CSS’s religious
requirements. The exclusion of same-sex couples is also overly harsh relative
to the option of indicating “dissent” by, respectively, preparing only standard
wedding cakes and specifying non-endorsement on the foster-parent
evaluation forms, rather than refusing altogether to provide these services to
same-sex couples.
If the Supreme Court had applied the definition of discrimination that it
utilized for evaluating the respondents in Masterpiece Cakeshop and Fulton
when assessing the religious petitioners in those cases, it would have found
their Free Exercise claims meritless. There was a time when observant
Catholics in the United States would have been grateful for a Free Exercise
jurisprudence that protected their right to practice their religion without
government interference. The fact that there are now at least six Catholic
Justices99 on the Court should not shift Free Exercise into a right to engage
in the very discrimination and religious coercion that gave rise to the religion
clauses in the first place.
With the right lens, we see that both MC and CSS were manifesting antiqueer bias rather than the values of tolerance and good works for which
98
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See United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 445 (D.D.C. 1968).

Chief Justice Roberts, Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, (maybe Gorsuch),
Kavanaugh, and Barrett are all Catholic. Alyssa Murphy, 6 of the 9 Supreme Court Justices
Are Catholic—Here’s a Closer Look, NAT’L CATH. REG. (Oct. 28, 2020),
https://www.ncregister.com/blog/supreme-court-catholics; David Crary, Associated Press, If
Barrett Joins, Supreme Court Would Have Six Catholics, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 26, 2020),
https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2020-09-26/if-barrett-joins-supreme-courtwould-have-six-catholics (noting that although Justice Gorsuch is now Protestant, he was
raised Catholic).
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Christianity is rightly known. We can see this truth most clearly when we
take the logic that the Court used to assess the behavior of the respondents in
the two cases we have studied and apply the same analysis to the behavior of
the petitioners. Rather than offering a mirror image, the two sides of these
cases present us with a funhouse mirror, one that distorts reality to such a
degree that the Court sincerely perceived discrimination that wasn’t there and
failed to detect the discrimination that was.

